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1 INTRODUCTION 
There are approximately 2,500 rail stations on the 
UK rail infrastructure controlled by Network Rail. 
Health and Safety legislation requires the organisa-
tion managing the station premises (either the Train 
Operating Company or Network Rail) to ensure that 
they are safe. Incidents are recorded using a national 
reporting system and guidance is provided to station 
staff on the measures (e.g. station cleaning regimes) 
likely to maintain station safety. 
One category of station safety incidents is those 
relating to passengers boarding or alighting from 
trains; approximately 1000 of these incidents, of 
varying severity, are recorded every year. This data 
is used to track the overall level of risk across the 
whole rail network. At this scale, the large number 
of (low severity) incidents permits a reliable, trended 
estimate of the risk (6.35 FWI/year as estimated in 
2009) and of the year on year trend of this risk. This 
analysis is used to assess progress against national 
targets and can inform national initiatives.  
1.1 Aims 
It would also be desirable to use the data to guide lo-
cal decision-making, by estimating: 
! the risk at specific stations and the profile be-
tween stations, and 
! the effectiveness of possible risk reductions inter-
ventions and controls. 
The difficulty of this is immediately apparent: since 
the number of stations greatly exceeds the number of 
incidents per year nationally, the number of events 
per station is low, with many stations where there 
are no recorded incidents. 
1.2 Key Features of Our Approach 
The key features of our approach to resolving this 
problem are: 
1 Use the records of incidents to estimate the im-
pact of different causal factors on the probability 
of each type of incident. 
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2 Use data on the characteristics and usage of sta-
tions on the network to determine the presence of 
causal factors at each station and the exposure to 
the risk at each station. 
Overall, the model is developed at two levels. The 
first level uses aggregated incident data to under-
stand the causes of incidents. The second level uses 
data about stations to complete the model of risk at 
each station. Although not all the data we would like 
is available it is clear that much of the data needed 
has already been collected for other purposes. 
1.3 Outline 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: 
in section 2 we describe the incident data and the 
way it is used in the existing Safety Risk Model 
(SRM). Section 3 outlines the proposed causal 
model for train boarding and alighting events, ex-
plaining how the different data sources are used to 
build the model. This is followed, in section 4, by a 
description of the way that the causal model can be 
used as part of a toolkit for local decision-making. 
Conclusions are in the final section.  
2 EXISTING ANALYSIS OF LOW 
CONSEQUENCE EVENTS IN THE SRM 
2.1 Data Reporting using SMIS 
SMIS (Safety Management Information System) is a 
national reporting system for the GB mainline rail 
network. SMIS is used by all Railway Group mem-
bers (including Network Rail, the Train Operating 
Companies, Freight Operating Companies and Infra-
structure Contractors) to record all safety related 
events that occur on Network Rail controlled infra-
structure. The primary requirement for safety inci-
dent reporting arises from the Reporting of Injuries, 
Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 
1995 (RIDDOR).  Since 2003, SMIS has been a 
web-based system. Data about station incidents is 
entered locally before being coded by a dedicated 
SMIS team. 
Figure 1 shows the number of reported incidents 
per year, for the years 2001 to 2009, covering falls 
while boarding and alighting from trains and inci-
dents of passengers being trapped in train doors.  
The data for boarding and alighting incidents in-
cludes: 
! Time and date 
! Location 
! Nature of injury 
! Narrative description of the event 
Table 1 shows the distribution of severity of events 
over the years 2001-2009. Severity is measured as 
FWI (Fatalities and Weighted Injuries) with an FWI 
= one fatality = 10 major injuries = 200 RIDDOR 
reportable minor injuries or class 1 shock/traumas = 
1,000 non-reportable minor injuries or class 2 
shock/traumas. 
 
Table 1: Distribution of Event Severities 
Injury Category FWI % of Total 
Fatal   1.0 0.06% 
Major   0.1 3.42% 
Shock trauma   0.005 4.55% 
Minor Reportable   0.005 17.79% 
Minor   0.001 74.18% 
2.2  The Safety Risk Model (SRM) 
The SRM consists of a series of risk models of 120 
hazardous events that, collectively, define the over-
all level of risk on the mainline railway in Great 
Britain. The reported risk estimates relate to the 
network-wide risk situation, and they indicate the 
current level of ‘residual risk’ (i.e. the level of risk 
remaining with the current risk control measures in 
place and with their current degree of effectiveness). 
The risk associated with a particular hazardous event 
is calculated as: Risk = Frequency x Consequence 
In this calculation ‘frequency’ is the estimated 
number of events occurring across the network per 
year and ‘consequence’ is the average consequences 
Figure 2 Relative Probabilities of Different Precursors Figure 1 Boarding and Alighting Incidents Per Year 
(in FWI) that are judged to occur should the hazard-
ous event occur, so that the risk is therefore the FWI 
expected per year.  
Low severity events, where the number of re-
ported incidents is relatively high, are analysed as 
follows: 
1 The incidents are first assigned an appropriate 
precursor, combining the person type, the primary 
cause of the incident and/or the location in which 
an incident occurs.   
2 A current incident rate for each precursor is 
judged by smoothing and where appropriate ex-
trapolating the year-on-year trends.  
3 Precursors with similar accident consequences are 
grouped together and severity estimates for these 
groups are calculated by averaging the conse-
quences over a number of events, over a number 
(typically 5) of years. 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the precursors 
used to categorise incidents of boarding and alight-
ing from trains. The most frequent precursors are: 
! PTBSFALL-H: Passenger injury while boarding 
stationary train 
! PTASFALL-H: Passenger injury while alighting 
stationary train 
! PPOBORAD-H: Train door closes on passenger 
(non-slam door stock) whilst boarding 
3 A CAUSAL MODEL OF TRAIN BOARDING 
AND ALIGHTING 
In this section we outline a causal model which can 
help manage (rather than just measure) the risk from 
train boarding and alighting incidents. The causal 
model is formed from three layers: 
1 Events with distinct causes 
2 Causal factors, influencing events 
3 Top-level factors, determining usage and influen-
cing causal factors. 
We describe each of the layers in turn. 
3.1 Events 
We classify the incidents into ‘events’, which have 
distinct causes. The events are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Events in the model 
Event Description 
Faint The passenger faints 
SlipP The passenger slips/falls on the platform 
SlipB The passenger falls between the train and the 
platform 
SlipT The passenger slips/falls on the train 
Trapped The passenger becomes trapped in the train 
door 
Figure 3 shows the events; we use the technique of 
Marsh & Bearfield (2008) to present the model as a 
generalised Event Tree, representing a Bayesian 
Network. 
3.2 Top-level factors 
The top-level factors are also shown in Figure 3. The 
factors jointly partition the event that exposes the 
passenger to risk: ‘boarding or alighting from a 
train’.   
Top-Level 
Factor 
Values Description 
Station There are 2,518 stations on the GB rail network 
Season Winter / Spring / 
Summer / 
Autumn 
The season influences the 
weather. 
Time of 
Day 
Rush hour / Nor-
mal 
Train usage is higher at some 
stations during the rush hour, 
making crowding more 
likely. 
We need to determine the proportion of the 
events occurring at each combination of station, 
season and time of day. The Office of Rail Regula-
tion (ORR) (2010) provides station usage data that 
can be used for this purpose. 
3.3 Causal factors, influencing events 
The causal factors are shown in Figure 4. For exam-
ple, the causes of falling between the train and plat-
form (event SlipB) are judged to be: 
! Vertical gap: the difference in height of the plat-
form surface and the train floor. 
! Curvature: the platform curvature, which creates 
a larger horizontal gap from the edge of the plat-
form to the train. 
! Behaviour: passengers who are intoxicated or 
rushing are more likely to fall.  
3.4 Determining probabilities. 
The probabilities in the model are completed by ana-
lysing the data in the following steps: 
1 The events. We estimate p(Faint), p(SlipP), 
p(SlipB), p(SlipT) and p(Trapped | SlipP) from 
the aggregated data. This requires each incident 
to be allocated to one of these categories: inci-
dents in each category are counted and the num-
ber of events divided by the number of boarding 
(alighting) events. We are exploring the use of 
search techniques to look for keywords in the un-
structured part of the SMIS data record to partly 
automate this classification. 
Figure 3 The Events and Top-Level Factors 
  
2 The causes of events. We need to go from 
p(Faint) to p(Faint | Weather, Capacity). Suppose 
there are 10 Faint incidents in 10,000 boarding 
events. We allocate these 10 events to both the 
Weather and the Capacity categories (there are 4 
of each). We then evaluate: 
 
Suppose Weather is ‘normal’ or ‘hot’ or ‘icy’. 
The value p(Weather=hot | Faint) is a table: 
Weather Faint No faint 
normal proportion of faints in 
normal weather 
proportion of rail jour-
neys in normal weather 
hot proportion of faints in 
hot weather 
proportion of rail jour-
neys in hot weather 
icy proportion of faints in 
icy weather 
proportion of rail jour-
neys in icy weather 
 total =1.0 total = 1.0 
 
3 The station properties. We need to determine 
the following for each station: Region, Crowd, 
Surface condition, Surface type, Curvature, Ver-
tical gap, Train type and Dispatch staff. Some of 
these are deterministic (e.g. Region). Train type 
will often be deterministic, except for stations 
used by a variety of train types. We are examin-
ing a variety of data sources for this data, but ex-
pect to supplement it with some expert elicitation. 
4 The weather and season. Data is needed for 
weather and season, by region. We will connect 
this to the incidents using dates and time of day. 
4 EXTENDING THE MODEL TO A TOOLKIT 
4.1 Requirements 
Legal requirements placed on organisations operat-
ing in the GB railway industry mandate some degree 
of risk assessment. Sections 2, 3 and 4 of Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA) (HMSO 1974) 
require all employers, including railway companies, 
to manage safety ‘so far as is reasonably practi-
cable’. The duty is not just to identify the risks in-
herent to the company’s work activity, but also 
minimise them as far as reasonably practicable. De-
termining whether an action is reasonably practi-
cable involves balancing its risks, costs and benefits. 
In order to determine what measures might be re-
quired under the law, there is therefore a require-
ment to be able to estimate the likely risk reduction 
achieved by a particular measure to combat the risk 
from boarding and alighting incidents, in order to 
weigh this against the cost (Bearfield 2009). In order 
to make a comparison of risks with costs, the risk 
needs to be translated into a financial value. This is 
done using the industry ‘Value of Preventing a Fa-
tality’ (VPF), a figure endorsed for use by the De-
partment for Transport, which is currently £1.6 mil-
lion per FWI averted.  
Companies might also consider a broader re-
quirement for applying measures, above and beyond 
any actual legal requirement, taking into account for 
example the possible impact of incidents on the rail 
company’s reputation and revenue, or the possibility 
Figure 4 The Complete Bayesian Network Model 
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of civil lawsuits from injured passengers. To support 
decisions about how to intervene to manage this risk 
a toolkit is therefore needed which: 
! Allows the risk reduction achieved by a range of 
measures to be estimated.  
! Supports the comparison of the costs of the 
measure with the risk reduction it achieves.  
4.2 Use of the Causal Model 
The proposed causal model can be used in two ways: 
1 Profiling the risk at different locations to set pri-
orities for interventions to reduce risk. 
2 Estimating the benefit of possible risk reduction 
measures.  
A range of measures could be considered, such as: 
! An appropriate cleaning regime: cleaning away 
contamination improves the slip resistance of a 
floor, but cleaning itself creates hazards, for ex-
ample by leaving excess water on a floor surface. 
! Winter precautions, such as the use of de-icing 
chemicals or grit to combat icy surfaces. 
! Prevention of tripping hazards: procedures for en-
suring that any trip hazards are prevented from 
occurring or removed in a timely fashion. 
! Application of robust train dispatch procedures to 
minimise the risk of passengers falling while 
boarding or being trapped in closing doors. 
! Civil engineering work to raise the height of plat-
forms. 
The potential cost of each of these measures varies 
significantly, as does their likely impact on train 
boarding and alighting risk. These various measures 
target different causes of boarding incidents. For the 
causal model to be used to analyse such interven-
tions, it is necessary for it to be sufficiently detailed 
that the precise causes targeted by each measure are 
specifically modelled allowing ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
estimates of risk to be calculated.   
There are precedents for such types of models in 
the GB railway industry. For example the ‘All Level 
Crossing Risk Model’ (ALCRM) (RSSB 2007) al-
lows risks to be estimated for the full range of dif-
ferent types of level crossing and incorporates cost-
benefit analysis and ‘what-if’ functionality. The 
model outlined here does not include the conse-
quence estimates, but it can be extended following 
the approach described in Marsh & Bearfield (2009). 
5 CONCLUSIONS 
We have outlined a way to enhance the modelling of 
low consequence incidents, intended to support the 
management of these risks, using the example of 
train boarding and alighting. The approach has the 
potential to be applied to a wide range of risks where 
data is available, but the number of incidents and the 
detail of the records does not allow direct estimation 
of the frequency and consequence of events at the 
level at which safety management interventions are 
made, conditioned on the factors that can be varied. 
5.1 Related Work 
The problems caused by excessive crowding on 
trains have been investigated (RSSB 2008). The is-
sues ranged from how crowding is defined by the 
industry, to developing a consistent approach across 
the railway network to the controls that might be put 
in place by station and train operators.  
Although the problem of falling from a platform 
when boarding or alighting a train are particular to 
the railway industry the problem of managing the 
risk from slips, trips and falls more generally is well 
known. The UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) 
provides a slip assessment tool which can be used to 
gather relevant information concerning floor surface 
properties, contamination, cleaning regimes, foot-
wear to calculate friction coefficients for different 
surfaces. This approach is useful in known problem 
areas, but is less useful for identifying areas of key 
risk and benchmarking performance.   
Statistical analysis of the causes of slips, trips and 
falls has also been undertaken for postal workers 
(Bentley, 1998). 
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